Questions about Questions
Posted by David Corfield
The British philosopher R. G. Collingwood wrote
…whenever anybody states a thought in words, there are a great many more thoughts in his mind than there are expressed in his statement. Among these there are some which stand in a peculiar relation to the thought he has stated; they are not merely its context, they are its presuppositions. (An Essay on Metaphysics, 1940, pp. 21-22)
In my book I proposed that dependent type theory is well-suited to represent such presuppositions, largely via the device of its notion of ‘context’ (pp. 57-58, 92). Ideas for this thesis came in part from discussions at the Café, including that generated by this post, concerning Collingwood’s treatment of the presuppositions of a complex question. Something perhaps worth developing then is a dependent type-theoretic treatment of questions.
Collingwood writes in his Autobiography:
…a logic in which the answers are attended and the questions neglected is a false logic. (Autobiography, 1939, p. 31)
What is ordinarily meant when a proposition is called ‘true’, I thought, was this: (a) the proposition belongs to a question-and-answer complex which as a whole is ‘true’ in the proper sense of the word; (b) within this complex it is an answer to a certain question; (c) the question is what we ordinarily call a sensible or intelligent question, not a silly one, or in my terminology it ‘arises’; (d) the proposition is the ‘right’ answer to that question. (R.G. Collingwood, Autobiography, p. 38)
What do we have then on the logical treatment of questions? Well the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy is a natural starting point. And consulting SEP: Questions, we find the briefest mention of a couple of type-theoretic approaches, but nothing on dependent types:
- Ciardelli, I., F. Roelofsen and N. Theiler, 2017. Composing alternatives, Linguistics and Philosophy, 40 (1): 1-36.
- Cooper R., Ginzburg J. 2012. Negative Inquisitiveness and Alternatives-Based Negation. In: Aloni M., Kimmelman V., Roelofsen F., Sassoon G.W., Schulz K., Westera M. (eds) Logic, Language and Meaning. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7218. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. doi
If presuppositions are usefully treated by dependent type theory, then we would expect this logic to account well for questions. This is a task Aarne Ranta begins in his Type-Theoretic Grammar (OUP, 1994, pp. 137-142), which I’ll look to expand somewhat here. If anyone knows of a place where this section of his book is developed, then please let me know.
A first distinction is between questions where it is presupposed that there is precisely one answer, and those where there may be any number of answers.
- ‘Who was in the bar last night?’ is likely to have multiple answers.
- ‘Which King of England reigned in 1507?’ has one.
Let’s just consider single-answer ones, for which Ranta mentions the following question types:
(1) ?, for a proposition.
(2) or ?, which one?
(3) Who, when, what , which , whither, whence, whose, how, how much/many/ long: to be understood as , for a proposition depending on .
(4) Iterated question: Who read which book? Who did what to whom? This is ?, etc.
Notes:
(2) isn’t quite or ?, even constructively, as it’s not expected that you say ‘Neither’. It seems to be presupposed that precisely one is true.
Ranta sees (1) as a case of (2), i.e., ‘?’ is really ‘ or not ?’.
(3) should include requesting an element of a type, say a canonical term given a non-canonical term, What is 2 + 2? as ?.
Perhaps (2) or ? could be taken as a case of (3) ? in the sense that ‘ or ?’ is ?
Ranta doesn’t mention ‘why’ specifically, but I think it deserves special treatment.
(5) Why ? This is highly dependent on the nature of , and the way the type that is has been generated by type formation rules and generators.
- In ordinary speech, will often speak of an event, and for this we need an analysis of the kind I give in II.6 of my book. I’ll talk about this more in a future post. For instance, if states that an activity is taking place with an intentional agent, then it may be asking for the achievement that will be the culmination of the activity. ‘Why does this state obtain?’ or ‘Why is the activity occurring?’ may request a previous activity or achievement. In a sense, then, this still asks ?, ‘Which achievement does this activity aim for?’, ‘Which state prompted this activity?’, ‘Which activity brought about this state?’
So ‘Why are you running?’ may be answered by: ‘I want to get fit.’; ‘To get away from the fire.’; ‘To reach the shop before it closes’, ‘I was told to’, etc.
Have any kinds of question been missed above?
Let me sign off with another combative quotation from Collingwood:
…[questions] must be asked in the right order. Descartes, one of the three great masters of the Logic of Questioning (the other two being Socrates and Bacon), insisted upon this as a cardinal point in scientific method, but so far as modern works on logic are concerned, Descartes might never have lived. Modern logicians are in a conspiracy to pretend that a scientist’s business is to ‘make judgments’, or ‘assert propositions’, or ‘apprehend facts’, and also to ‘assert’ or ‘apprehend’ the relations between them; suggesting that they have no experience of scientific thinking, and wish to palm off, as an account of scientific thinking, an account of their own haphazard, unsystematic, unscientific consciousness. (The Principles of History, p. 29)
Re: Questions about Questions
It might be fun to look into connections between dependent type systems and logic-based query languages.
Some well-known examples of what I mean by logic-based query languages:
These are listed in order of increasing expressiveness, and λProlog is Turing-complete, so may be too different from natural language questions. But λProlog also seems the closest of the 3 to type theory. And I think logic programmers still have something called “queries”. (The goal clauses, I think.) None of these use dependent types.
(I figure the main threat to your program of basing philosophy on dependent type theory is not that it’s not powerful enough, but that it could appear to be an unnecessary complication. In programming languages too, many problems are successfully addressed without dependent types.)
You might try talking to Neel Krishnaswami about this. He has a blog post about a variant of Datalog he worked on, using some type systems ideas. (And he’s a type theorist who’s commented on this blog before.)
Twelf (stubby article on the nLab) is the only example I know of of a tool based on dependent types, and with a focus on logic programming. But other dependent type systems support it, via propositions-as-types and proof search.